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EARLY DISSENT WITHIN THE PARTY:  
ALEXANDER SHLIAPNIKOV AND  
THE LETTER OF THE TWENTY-TWO1 
  
 
On February 26, 1922, twenty-two Russian Communist party members
2
 of 
working class origins appealed in writing
3
 to the Executive of the Communist 
International (Comintern) to help “heal the rift” they thought had emerged be-
tween workers and party leaders in Russia. The Twenty-Two were former met-
alworkers, had played some role in the All-Russian Union of Metalworkers, and 
had a long history of advocating worker activism and leadership within the Bol-
shevik party. A. Kollontai (1898) and Z. Shadurskaia added their signatures to 
those of the original Twenty-Two. As they thought all leading bodies of the 
Russian Communist party (RCP/b/) had ignored their grievances, the Comintern 
was their last and highest court of appeal. The signatories complained that 
“bourgeois” elements had flooded into the party, diluting the influence of “pro-
letarian” members and fostering the suppression of dissent among worker 
Communists. They protested the suppression of participatory democracy within 
trade unions and the trend toward unilateral decision-making by the “party and 
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trade union bureaucracy.” Russian party leaders responded with consternation to 
the “Letter of the Twenty-Two” and pressured Comintern leaders to denounce it. 
Further, they initiated a campaign in the press to distort the letter’s contents and 
slander those who signed it. The Fifth Congress of the All-Russian Metalwork-
ers’ Union served as an arena for party leaders to rehearse the campaign against 
the “Twenty-Two” that they would mount at the Eleventh Party Congress. De-
bates at open and closed sessions of the party congress, and political maneuver-
ing behind the scenes revealed much about the dialogue between party leaders 
and highly placed members on the meaning of party discipline and the limits of 
internal political discussion and disagreement. It is important to rediscover the 
“workerist” tendency within the party that the Twenty-Two represented, but that 
is not the purpose of this article. Rather this article argues that events surround-
ing the “Letter of the Twenty Two” constituted a critical episode in the party’s 
internal debate over the extent to which members could criticize party policy 
and over the meaning of party discipline at a time when the influence of Lenin 
over the party was fading and that of Stalin was rising. Re-examination of this 
episode, using newly available sources, can help trace the Bolsheviks’ course 
toward personal dictatorship and determine key turning points along that path.  
 
Background 
The Comintern was founded in March 1919 in Moscow as a replacement for 
the Second International, which had collapsed in 1914, as member parties disa-
greed over support for national war efforts. The assumption on which the Com-
intern was initially based was that world revolution was imminent and its chief 
goal was to “hasten international socialist revolution.” The Comintern and its 
Executive were to be the supreme organs of the international communist move-
ment and their decisions were to take precedence over those of any member par-
ty. In practice, because the Comintern was based in Russia and Grigory Zino-
viev, a RCP(b) politburo member, chaired it since 1919, the Russian party lead-
ers held increasing sway over the body. Lenin and Zinoviev had authored the 
guiding Twenty-One Points, adopted by the Comintern in 1920.
4
 One of the 
points stipulated that individuals belonging to any member-party had the right to 
appeal to the Comintern as the highest organ of the international Communist 
movement, either separately or collectively, if their grievances were not satisfied 
by the leading organs of their national party.   
The Twenty-Two therefore had reason to believe that their appeal to the 
Comintern was “legal.” An expanded Comintern Executive was to meet from 
February 24 to March 4, 1922
5
 to discuss the Russian party leaders’ proposed 
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“united front,” which was to unite all revolutionary socialists (including anar-
chists and syndicalists) and social democratic workers in struggle against inter-
national capital and reformist socialist leaders. In fact, the leadership of the Rus-
sian-dominated Comintern intended to centralize the international communist 
movement under its leadership. Thus, the occasion provided an opportunity for 
the Twenty-Two to reveal the deep disagreements existing within the RCP(b); 
but in so doing, the Twenty-Two undermined Russian party leaders’ campaign 
for a united front. 
At the center of the controversy was Alexander Shliapnikov (1885-1937),
6
 a 
party and trade union leader of working class origin (a skilled metalworker) who 
believed strongly in worker initiative and self-emancipation; his devotion to 
those goals stood out as the guiding principle behind his political and trade un-
ion work. In 1919-1920, Shliapnikov, with leaders of the Russian Metalworkers’ 
Union, had formed the “Workers’ Opposition,” which called on trade unionists 
and party members to allow trade unions the leading role in directing the econ-
omy. Alexandra Kollontai
7
 mentored the Workers’ Opposition, participated in 
some of its meetings, spoke on its behalf, and published a brochure about the 
group for the Tenth Party Congress (Rabochaya oppozitsiia). The changes 
Shliapnikov had perceived in the leadership’s attitudes toward workers and in 
workers’ role in the new society had moved him to organize.8 In his view, Bol-
shevik intellectuals and Soviet leaders had developed a pessimistic view of 
workers’ potential to govern. At the same time, bureaucratic and reactionary 
“elements” had taken advantage of the harsh exigencies of Civil War to “disem-
power” workers and annul the achievements of the October revolution as he 
viewed them.   
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To renew the party’s commitment to worker empowerment, the Workers’ 
Opposition called for a “workerization” of the Communist party, by introducing 
a preponderance of workers into leading party organs. The opposition also called 
for trade unions to exercise controlling influence over government economic or-
gans and to implement economic policy. The Workers’ Opposition gained 
strength and its proposals acquired momentum during the winter of 1919-1920, 
especially after Trotsky’s theses calling for the “militarization of labor” outraged 
trade unionists.
9
 When the trade union debate, which had been simmering 
throughout 1920, was opened in the party press in December of that year, the 
Workers’ Opposition began to organize a campaign to elect delegates to the 
Tenth Party Congress, scheduled for March 1921. Kollontai wrote a pamphlet in 
support of the Workers’ Opposition,10 which appeared in print as the Tenth Party 
Congress opened and which became the best-known document of the group. 
Kollontai’s passionate and lucid exposition of the Oppositionists’ views created 
a stir among the delegates. Influenced by the Kronstadt uprising and Lenin’s 
frightening warnings of the ideological threat posed by the Workers’ Opposi-
tion, congress delegates not only voted against the opposition’s proposals, but 
censured the oppositionists, banning further factionalism within the party.     
With Lenin’s support a few concessions were made to the opposition. The 
congress elected Shliapnikov and two other Workers’ Oppositionists to the party 
central committee (CC), he was selected to chair a commission to improve 
workers’ living conditions, and he and other oppositionists were included in 
purge commissions entrusted with the task of “cleansing” the party of “oppor-
tunist elements.” Through his new positions, Shliapnikov attempted to expand 
the role of trade unions in the Soviet state to include management of production. 
Shliapnikov’s commitment to worker control of industry through unions and to 
state investment in heavy industry, however, clashed with the party’s conces-
sions to private industry and to peasant agriculture in the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) approved by the Tenth Party Congress. When he criticized some aspects 
of NEP before an audience of factory-level Communists, he provoked a confron-
tation with the politburo.   
The majority of the politburo aligned with Lenin and Zinoviev and sought to 
strengthen the party’s control over trade unions. Their policy included diluting 
the strength of the former Workers’ Opposition within the Metalworkers’ Union. 
The Leninists could not allow Shliapnikov and his supporters to make a faction-
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al weapon from the Metalworkers’ Union. In the course of 1921, Shliapnikov 
was removed from his position as chairman of the Metalworkers’ Union and the 
union leadership was packed with supporters of the politburo’s trade union 
line.
11
 Shliapnikov was nearly expelled from the CC in August 1921 on charges 
of violating party discipline and encouraging factionalism within the party.     
He and his supporters did not operate from the same set of assumptions 
about the meaning of “democracy” within the party and about the role of work-
ers in directing their organizations, as did the Leninists. The opposition per-
ceived the Leninists’ actions as part of a coordinated effort to denude the pro-
duction unions of their strongest defenders. In response, Shliapnikov and his 
colleagues, the Twenty-Two, decided to make one last appeal, this time to the 
Comintern, as the highest court in the international communist movement.  
 
Private meetings of the Twenty-Two 
Shliapnikov and his supporters decided to appeal to the Comintern only after 
much discussion. In February 1922 Shliapnikov held several secret meetings 
with colleagues in the Metalworkers’ Union to discuss their tactics, goals, and a 
course of action at the upcoming Fifth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union and 
the Eleventh Party Congress. Those meetings, organized by Sergei Medvedev
12
 
(Shliapnikov’s friend since 1907 and co-leader of the Workers’ Opposition), are 
of interest for the diversity they show among the oppositionists, the way in 
which Shliapnikov analyzed his fellow oppositionists’ proposals, and for what 
they reveal about Shliapnikov’s cautious political tactics. The meetings reveal 
divisions between oppositionists at the center and at the local level, between ad-
vocates of trade unions and advocates of soviets as organs better suited for de-
mocratization of Soviet life, and between those who thought it necessary to stay 
within the Communist party and those who wanted to create a new, improved 
workers’ party. Participating in the February meetings were communists, all 
former metalworkers, who perceived the role of workers within the Communist 
party as diminishing.   
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A close connection existed between participants and the former Workers’ 
Opposition. Eight had signed the theses of the Workers’ Opposition,13 while 
nearly all had supported the opposition. The chief exception was Gavril Mias-
nikov,
14
 who would go on to found the “Workers’ Group” within the RCP(b). 
Medvedev took notes of the proceedings (the account of the meetings provided 
below is based on his handwritten notes, which were confiscated by Soviet se-
cret police upon his arrest for political crimes in 1935 and which are now stored 
in the archives of the Federal Security Service).
15
 The first meeting in mid-
February 1922 was devoted to discussing the political thoughts of workers at the 
local level, the role of unions under NEP, the attempt to create a united workers’ 
front in Europe (announced at the December 1921 CC plenum), and the group’s 
further plan of action.   
All participants reported a dismal mood among both communist and nonpar-
ty workers. F. Mitin
16
 flatly stated that party and union life were dead, that dis-
cussion was often forbidden, and that many communists and unionists no longer 
tried to make proposals or discuss important questions because they felt it did 
not matter. Miasnikov reported that in Perm everyone was afraid of the political 
police (Cheka) and in Ekaterinburg unionists were afraid to publish anything. He 
reported that entire cells of communists were leaving the party, some enticed 
back only by gifts of boots from party leaders.
17
 A participant from Moscow 
spoke of apathy among Moscow worker-communists and indignation at the So-
viet government’s ordering industrial products from abroad rather than subsidiz-
ing their production within Russia.
18
 
The oppositionists blamed one another for missed opportunities. A partici-
pant from Ukraine complained that leading oppositionists there had missed the 
opportunity to galvanize opposition to leaders of the Metalworkers’ Union at a 
recent trade union conference; he believed that the opposition could have taken 
over the leadership if only its leaders had rallied and spoken. Local representa-
tives blamed Shliapnikov and others in the “center” (Moscow) for not showing 
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enough direction and leadership and for allowing a gulf to open between leaders 
of the opposition and potential supporters.   
The situation in Nikolaev was instructive. Mitin urged Shliapnikov and his 
supporters to provide leadership for an already existing “underground” organiza-
tion in Nikolaev, which had no leadership of its own.
19
 According to one of the 
participants (possibly Mitin), the Workers’ Opposition in Nikolaev had been so 
strong that its supporters had proven to be the overwhelming majority (eighty-
four of one hundred) at the local congress of trade unions. When the congress’s 
oppositionist majority clashed with the Leninist majority in the guberniia union 
committee, central party leaders sent D. Manuilsky
20
 (a CC member and Lenin-
ist) to Nikolaev; Manuilsky transferred about ninety prominent supporters of the 
Workers’ Opposition elsewhere. Some in Nikolaev continued to organize, but 
lacked capable leaders. They reportedly resented Shliapnikov and other central 
opposition figures in Moscow for not giving leadership or rendering aid. Shliap-
nikov refused to discuss the possibility of providing leadership for the Nikolaev 
group, although he said that he saw nothing harmful in the organization of such 
groups and clubs in Russia.
21
 Thus, he tacitly encouraged his supporters to form 
groups on the local level, but refused to set up a centralized network of leader-
ship that would bring charges of factionalism from party leaders. 
To Mitin’s criticism of him and others in the “center” for absence of leader-
ship, Shliapnikov responded that he and the “centrists” had sensed no support 
from the regions. Shliapnikov rebuked his local supporters for not working 
closely enough with workers in the factories, for providing insufficient material 
for a political platform, and for offering little concrete information about the 
moods, desires and life of workers at the local level. The problem lay not only at 
the local level.  Shliapnikov admitted that the opposition itself had to a certain 
extent become demoralized.
22
 Despite their dejection Shliapnikov and his sup-
porters attempted to explore where their views coincided and to develop the fu-
ture tactics of the group. The most important issue was the role of unions under 
NEP.   
A discordant note was sounded by Miasnikov’s views on unions’ and sovi-
ets’ roles in the management of production. He shared Shliapnikov’s concerns 
about the party dictatorship, but went further than Shliapnikov in his criticisms 
of it.  Like Shliapnikov and his supporters, Miasnikov had suffered at the hands 
of party leaders for outspoken criticism of the diminishing role of workers in the 
party and in management of the economy. Miasnikov and the Workers’ Opposi-
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tion could not agree on precisely who should manage production; Miasnikov 
advocated the soviets, the Workers’ Opposition advocated unions. Most of 
Shliapnikov’s supporters were opposed to Miasnikov’s proposal to give man-
agement of production to the soviets, seeing the likelihood of further strengthen-
ing the peasantry’s influence over state policy. Shliapnikov harshly criticized 
Miasnikov’s plan for management through the soviets, saying it in essence 
meant the “organization of peasant unions.” He concluded, “The working class 
should not organize a unit hostile to it.”  Later in the meeting Shliapnikov ex-
pressed the fear that the Communist party was degenerating and falling into the 
hands of “a peasant element, which wants to become the complete master of 
Russia.”23 The fact that Shliapnikov would invite Miasnikov to discuss his 
views, despite Shliapnikov’s adamant opposition to them, reflects the im-
portance that he placed on including communists of worker origin in party dis-
course. 
Discussion of Miasnikov’s views on soviet vs. union management of produc-
tion led to a more general discussion of what role unions should assume in the 
face of their exclusion from an important managing role in production (whether 
by soviets or by state economic organs). Pravdin
24
 exclaimed how perplexing he 
found the fact that the proletariat could be removed from management in a pro-
letarian state. He questioned whether the Communist party was “really the party 
of the proletariat” and if it were, why had the proletarian party “overthrown the 
proletariat.” All participants saw NEP as a setback for the revolution. Tolo-
kontsev
25
 for one, although accepting the necessity of NEP, believed that the 
working class should lead its implementation. As for the role of unions under 
NEP, he declared that if they would not be allowed to manage production, then 
they should “defend the interests of their members.” In essence, he argued that 
unions should resume their pre-revolutionary role as defenders of workers’ 
rights in the workplace. Another participant thought this role impossible under 
existing conditions; he declared that trade unions could not resort to carrying out 
strikes, the ultimate method of pressure against employers, because they had no 
strike funds.
26
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Early Dissent within the Party: Alexander Shliapnikov and the Letter of the Twenty-Two               29 29 
The final question on the agenda of the meeting concerned further tactics.  
Views differed considerably. Tolokontsev believed it reasonable for the meet-
ing’s participants to entertain the idea of splitting from the Communist party and 
creating a worker party. Pointing to the example of the underground organiza-
tion in Nikolaev, which was in need of leadership, he suggested that potential 
supporters for a worker party were available. One participant favored delaying a 
decision on whether to split from the party, because the group had not prepared 
and organized well enough for such an act. Instead, he proposed to organize 
“circles with a leading group” within the Communist party. Pravdin was totally 
opposed to a split; instead, he called for “strong means” to heal the party (but 
did not specify what means he thought were necessary). An attempt to form a 
new party would make a strong symbolic statement but would also be suicidal; 
the Cheka would crush it, and its participants would have no further chance to 
influence party policy. Both Miasnikov and Vladimirov,
27
 secretary of the All-
Russian Metalworkers’ Union, called for Shliapnikov and Medvedev to prepare 
a platform and present it to their supporters for discussion. Others seemed to 
agree, but Medvedev objected that he and Shliapnikov could not just compose a 
platform; it had to be the product of collective work. He found this quite unlike-
ly, however, because of the diversity of opinions within the group. Further, he 
commented sardonically that some of those demanding a platform feared to 
“write anything that would diverge from the decrees of the CC.” Shliapnikov 
flatly called the demand for a platform “impossible.”28 He was deeply commit-
ted to observing party legality; he knew that to present a platform would violate 
the ban on factionalism passed by the Tenth Party Congress.   
Nevertheless, against Shliapnikov’s protests, his supporters voted to assign 
him and Medvedev to elaborate a political platform that would be discussed at a 
meeting on February 20, 1922 for presentation to the Eleventh Party Congress. 
Medvedev’s notes indicate that he and Shliapnikov prepared not a platform but a 
set of theses that were discussed at a meeting that included Shliapnikov and 
those sympathetic to his views.
29
 Neither Shliapnikov nor Medvedev ever pre-
sented these theses to a party assembly. The fact that Shliapnikov’s colleagues 
would order him and Medvedev to prepare a platform and that they would ig-
nore that order and prepare a different type of document, perhaps even for an 
audience different from the one that the others at the meeting intended, testifies 
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ries in Sormovo, Moscow and Petersburg while pursuing illegal revolutionary activities and trade 
union organization, was arrested and sent to Siberian exile several times. From 1917 to 1922, he was 
secretary and treasurer of the Metalworkers’ Union’s central committee (Deiateli revoliutsionnogo 
dvizheniia v Rossii (Leipzig: Zentralantiquariat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1974); 
Rasstrel'nye spiski: Moskva 1937-1941 (Moscow: Obshchestvo “Memorial,”  2000). This is not the 
same person as Miron Konstantinovich Vladimirov (née Sheinfinkel) who worked in Narkomprod 
and died of natural causes in 1926. 
28. TsA FSB, R33718, vol. 40, ll. 127-28. 
29. TsA FSB, R33718, vol. 40, l. 128, ll. 133-39.  
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to the chaotic relationship between Shliapnikov and those who shared his con-
cern for a workers’ role in socialist society. 
Despite talk of presenting a platform or theses, in the end Shliapnikov and 
his colleagues decided both of those steps would too easily provoke charges of 
factionalism and entail prosecution by party leaders. Instead, Shliapnikov and 
twenty-one others decided to appeal to the Comintern. He believed that an ap-
peal to the Comintern would be less likely to smack of factionalism than would 
the platform or theses of a group.
30
 Kollontai could also be effective in that set-
ting. Although she had not collaborated with Shliapnikov in opposition since 
summer 1921 and there is no evidence that she was present at any of the private 
meetings Shliapnikov held with the original signatories in February 1922, she 
shared Shliapnikov’s concerns, as well as his hopes for the Comintern’s impar-
tiality and his sense that appeal to it was the only route that remained. Shliapni-
kov and Medvedev had always valued her talents as a persuasive speaker
 
(in 
several languages) and hoped she might sway an international audience. Moreo-
ver, Kollontai was scheduled to speak on the “woman question” at the Comin-
tern’s conference and so there was the possibility that she, more easily than oth-
ers of the Twenty-Two, could interject some words on behalf of the appeal. It is 
telling that Shliapnikov sincerely believed that the appeal had a chance of con-
sideration by the Comintern. His commitment to the ideas of worker empower-
ment and internationalism blinded him to the influence of Russian party leaders 
in the Comintern, which was so strong that realistically his tactics were hope-
less. 
 
At the Comintern Executive 
The “Letter of the Twenty-Two,” with the signatures of Kollontai and her 
close friend Zoya Shadurskaia
31
 added to those of the original twenty-two, was 
presented to the Comintern Executive on February 26, 1922. In the letter, the 
twenty-two signatories called on the Comintern, before approving the Russian 
party leaders’ plan for a united workers’ front in Western Europe, to “heal the 
rift” between workers and party leaders in Russia. Shliapnikov found it unlikely 
that the Russian Communist party could lead an international effort for a “united 
workers’ front,” when there was so much disunity and reduction of workers’ 
role within the Russian party itself. The signatories further claimed that the 
“proletariat’s” influence over the Russian Communist party had been weakened 
by a strong influx of “bourgeois” elements into the party. They complained that 
party leaders had crushed dissent within the party, especially from proletarian 
members. They revealed that suppression had extended to trade unions where 
members were not allowed to elect their own leaders and the decisions of union 
congresses were annulled or ignored by the “party and trade union bureaucracy.” 
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As a result, the twenty-two communists declared, communist workers were be-
coming disillusioned and leaving the party. Finally, the signatories expressed 
their support for a united international workers’ front, but first asked that the 
Comintern intervene to help heal the rift between Russian communist workers 
and their leaders and to “eliminate the threat of a schism hanging over our par-
ty.”32   
When Kollontai attempted to speak before the Comintern conference on Feb-
ruary 26, 1922 on behalf of the views expressed in the appeal, Russian party 
leaders (most notably Trotsky and Zinoviev) on the presidium
33
 of the Comin-
tern conference had her name removed from the list of orators. In a private 
meeting with Kollontai, they urged her not to speak. Zinoviev insisted that sup-
port for the united front was a party directive that the entire Russian delegation 
had to pursue without reservations. When Kollontai proved recalcitrant, Trotsky 
forbade her to speak and issued a decree, in the name of the CC, ordering all 
members of the Russian delegation to “obey the directives of the party.”34 Thus, 
both Trotsky and Zinoviev stifled criticism in the name of party discipline.   
 On the next day, February 27, the politburo delegated Zinoviev and Trotsky 
to convince the Comintern Executive
35
 that the claims within the Letter of the 
Twenty-Two were distortions and that the letter was a factionalist statement of 
the former Workers’ Opposition.36 The Comintern created a commission to in-
vestigate the letter. It included Clara Zetkin, the French Communists Ludovic-
Oscar Frossard and Marcel Cachin, and the young Italian Communist Umberto 
Terracini (b. 1895)
37
; they interviewed Shliapnikov and Kollontai on March 3, 
1922. According to Kollontai, the commission only “hastily” questioned her and 
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Shliapnikov and then sat in a long session with Trotsky and Zinoviev, after 
which it roundly condemned the letter and its signatories. The commission cen-
sured the Twenty-Two and warned them not to make such an appeal in the fu-
ture. Kollontai recalled the scene in her diary:   
 
Kreibich . . . pronounced an accusatory, prosecutorial speech against us, 
woven out of cunning attacks (the author, obviously, was Radek). . . .  Rad-
ek spoke crudely against us, chiefly against me. . . . And no one protested! 
Even the old lady Clara [Zetkin] was silent. To what degree has Zinoviev 
developed lackeyism, cowardice! 
 
In retrospect, it is difficult to see how the Twenty-Two could possibly have 
succeeded in having the Comintern approve their appeal because Zinoviev and 
other Soviet Communist party leaders held that organization so tightly in rein. 
Their appeal to the Comintern signified that Shliapnikov and the others had al-
ready been backed into a corner and could not pursue any productive course of 
action. Kollontai’s assessment of the appeal underlined a vague hope in its sig-
nificance as a principled act: “At least someone decided to speak the truth. And I 
think, that this act will not pass in vain, it will force some to think, to understand 
that it is not possible to continue thus in the future.”38    
 
Fifth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union 
A few days after the twenty-two Russian communists had presented their 
appeal to the Comintern, the Fifth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union con-
vened. The communist fraction of the congress met from March 2-8. Before the 
congress began, Shliapnikov and those who shared his views had determined to 
wage a campaign to reassume the leadership of their union, but this seemed un-
likely. Since the last session of the union’s central committee in October, some 
of Shliapnikov’s backers had vacillated in their support. In addition, the politbu-
ro took determined measures before the congress to ensure that candidates it ap-
proved would lead the union. Finally, as the fraction convened, it appeared 
doubtful whether Shliapnikov’s supporters comprised a majority of delegates. 
On the eve of the congress, Shliapnikov and his allies were uncertain of their 
strength. At one of their meetings before the congress began, it was notable that 
Vladimirov was not present. He had apparently withdrawn from the struggle. 
Those who remained decided that their primary goal at the congress would be to 
give “rebuff” to the “coalition of fools and careerists” in the union’s leadership. 
If they could win a majority of the fraction, they would push for implementation 
of their decisions. If half of the fraction were with them, they would push for 
proportional representation in the union’s leadership. If they had a “resolute” 
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large minority, they would carry the struggle to “lower organs” of the union.39 
They did not address the question of what to do if they had a majority but the 
CC (or politburo) struck down their decisions, as had occurred at the last con-
gress, when Shliapnikov and many of his supporters submitted to party disci-
pline.
40
   
Meanwhile, the politburo was preparing for a confrontation at the congress. 
On February 20, 1922, it accepted Lenin’s proposal to create under the orgburo 
a “special commission for the verification and renewal of the leading heights of 
the trade union movement.”41 On February 23, the politburo instructed the or-
gburo commission and the bureau of the communist fraction of VTsSPS to de-
cide the composition of the new central committee of the Metalworkers’ Union. 
The politburo further instructed guberniia party committees to decide the com-
position of gubernia-level union committees.
42
 
The communist fraction of the central committee of the Metalworkers’ Un-
ion met on February 24, 1922 to consider theses to endorse for the congress. I. 
Lepse,
43
 a Leninist and Shliapnikov’s replacement in 1921 as chair of the union, 
presented theses. No rival theses were offered. If Shliapnikov’s supporters had 
planned to present theses, they backed down before this meeting. Sixteen voting 
members were present.
44
 Eight of them had formerly supported the Workers’ 
Opposition. Nevertheless, eleven of the sixteen voted for Lepse’s theses, indicat-
ing that several of Shliapnikov’s supporters had shifted. Of six candidate mem-
bers present,
45
 five voted against Lepse’s theses, with one in favor, but their 
votes did not count in the official total.
46
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One more important meeting occurred on the eve of the congress. The bu-
reau of the communist fraction of the central committee of the Metalworkers’ 
Union met with representatives of the larger regional delegations of the congress 
to nominate candidates for the presidium of the congress. Shliapnikov did not at-
tend. Lepse and Vladimirov (who was not present) were unanimously elected to 
the presidium. The only supporter of Shliapnikov who appeared to be present 
was Deulenkov of Moscow, who nominated Shliapnikov as the representative to 
the presidium from Moscow. All others present voted against Shliapnikov.
47
     
The communist fraction of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of the Metal-
workers’ Union convened on March 2, 1922, with 161 communist metalworkers 
attending. The bureau of the communist fraction of the union’s central commit-
tee presented one list for the presidium of the congress; Skliznev, a supporter of 
Shliapnikov, presented another list.
48
 Vladimirov and Tarasov removed their 
names from the list of the bureau of the fraction; Tarygin and Lepse removed 
their names from Skliznev’s list. The fraction’s vote immediately showed that 
those loyal to the politburo (and opposing Shliapnikov) had a majority, although 
not an overwhelming one. By 85-76, the fraction confirmed the bureau’s list for 
the presidium (Lepse, Vorobev, Gurevich, Klinov, Radchenko, Matrozov, 
Tarygin, Bukhanov, Balandin and Damaskin).
49
 None of these were Shliapni-
kov’s supporters. 
Shliapnikov had made a few brief comments before voting for the presidium 
took place. He urged that delegates not let their votes be influenced by accusa-
tions swirling around the Letter of the Twenty-Two to the Comintern. Further-
more, he withdrew from his supporters’ struggle to resume control of the union. 
He asked that his name also be removed from Skliznev’s list for the presidium, 
since he could “already see what is going to come of this congress.”50 Neverthe-
less, voices from the floor nominated Shliapnikov for the presidium. Ianson re-
jected their calls and, disparaging Shliapnikov, said, “It is possible to bandy 
one’s name about, to be a noisy cart, but to do little in everyday work.” Ianson 
proposed Vladimirov instead, as an example of a diligent and hard worker.
51
   
In refusing his nomination to the presidium, Vladimirov, as at the previous 
congress, spoke passionately. He declared that he had never yearned for high-
ranking posts, but had worked hard “because I sensed the vibrancy of this 
work.” Nevertheless, for the preceding six months, he had suffered more at his 
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job than he had in tsarist prisons, he said. Furthermore, he maintained that he 
would refuse to hold a post in the union’s central committee, even if he were to 
be charged with violating party discipline. Vladimirov concluded, “I am thank-
ful for your trust in me for four years, but this time I ask you to leave me in 
peace.” Lepse cast aspersions on Vladimirov’s loyalty to the party, but the frac-
tion allowed him to resign and replaced him with Gurevich. When Kiselev re-
quested that Tashkin replace Balandin on the presidium, Tashkin refused, for the 
same reasons as Vladimirov.
52
 Thus, these proceedings showed disarray among 
Shliapnikov’s supporters, between those such as Skliznev and Kiselev, who still 
wanted to fight, and, on the other hand, Shliapnikov, Vladimirov, Tashkin, and 
Tarasov, who refused to participate. 
Next, Medvedev gave a speech on the role of the Metalworkers’ Union un-
der NEP.
 
Medvedev was only allowed to speak after forty-two communist met-
alworkers signed an appeal to the union’s leadership to allow him to do so.53 His 
central theme was unions’ role in defending workers under NEP. He called for 
the right of workers in capitalist enterprises to strike and for the union to create 
strike funds and unemployment funds; for without those, capitalists would not 
abide by collective agreements.
54
 Significantly, he wanted to extend this discus-
sion to consider unions’ defense of workers not only in capitalist enterprises, but 
also in state enterprises, implying his doubts that the “proletarian state” actually 
ruled in the interests of the “proletariat.”55 Finally, Medvedev declared unions 
should use their influence in the soviets to defend workers. He made it clear that 
he was not calling for independence of unions from state power, as did the Men-
sheviks and SRs; on the contrary, he believed that if unions were independent, 
they would have far less influence over state policy. Gurevich called 
Medvedev’s proposals “anti-Marxist” and said that it was no longer necessary to 
use “old methods” of trade union work. He complained that since Medvedev had 
not presented theses, his opponents had not had the opportunity to make a thor-
ough critique of his views.
56
 Conversely, since Medvedev did not present theses, 
there was no opportunity to gauge support for his views among delegates. 
Shliapnikov, who spoke after Medvedev and Gurevich, explained that 
Medvedev had not offered any theses because he, Shliapnikov, and their sup-
porters had “learned from bitter experience” that when they introduced theses 
their opponents accused them of creating a faction. In response to Gurevich, 
Shliapnikov said that old methods of trade union work would not be necessary 
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only if “everything in our government had changed.”57 Unfortunately, Shliapni-
kov continued, government policy “now is not new but old.” War communism 
and the nationalization of enterprises, he declared, had been a “new economic 
policy.” Rather than being a necessary outgrowth of the hardship of civil war, he 
argued, those radical policies had provoked civil war. Shliapnikov said, “Let’s 
call ‘new’ the economic policy which was new in relation to capitalism and not 
that which is our policy at the present time.” Shliapnikov’s hawkish defense of 
war communism illustrated the uncompromising nature of his views on how to 
build and lead a socialist state. Despite his defense of Medvedev’s assumptions 
about the nature of NEP, Shliapnikov differed with Medvedev on the use of 
strikes. Rather than assume strikes were the most effective recourse against capi-
talists who had leased factories, Shliapnikov advocated that “state laws and 
courts” be used to enforce collective agreements between concessionaires and 
workers and their unions.
58
 Shliapnikov, then, demonstrated more confidence in 
the state than did Medvedev. 
After Shliapnikov’s remarks, delegates prepared to vote on two lists for the 
new central committee of the union. But before their vote Tomsky informed del-
egates of the politburo’s highly critical view of the Letter of the Twenty-Two. 
Ianson, a loyal member of the union’s “new” leadership, responded by propos-
ing a list for the new central committee of the union that would exclude those 
old members who led the appeal to the Comintern. Thus, Shliapnikov accused 
Tomsky of provoking a split.
59
 Contrary to Ianson’s proposal, Medvedev urged 
delegates to elect a “strong, authoritative central committee” that would be able 
to exert its influence on such vital questions as the “necessity to stop orders 
abroad for equipment that could be made at home.” Further, he warned delegates 
against being pressured to participate in persecution of dissenters.
60
   
During the debate over elections to the new central committee, Shliapnikov’s 
sympathizers criticized the central committee that had existed between the 
fourth and fifth congresses for having accomplished nothing, because, as ap-
pointees, its members had no credibility. In response, Lepse pointed out that the 
majority of the central committee had nearly always been on Shliapnikov’s and 
Medvedev’s side. He neglected to mention that decision-making power had been 
reserved for the secretariat and presidium of the union, which were dominated 
by Shliapnikov’s opponents. Arguing that “appointmentism” was a legitimate 
tradition in the history of Communist (or Bolshevik) relations with trade unions, 
Lepse accused Shliapnikov of having been an appointee in 1917.
61
 Shliapnikov 
protested this attempt to revise party history, recalling that when the CC as-
signed him to win over the Metalworkers’ Union in 1917, he was the sole Bol-
shevik in the bureau leading the union. The other two members were Menshe-
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viks. When he and his comrades won the union, Shliapnikov insisted, “we con-




Despite delegates’ applause for Shliapnikov, predictably, his supporters did 
not prevail when the time came to vote for the new central committee of the un-
ion. Vorobev nominated a list in the name of the old central committee of the 
union and of major regional committees. Skliznev, presumably representing 
Shliapnikov’s supporters, nominated a rival list. Vorobev’s list included repre-
sentatives from the regions
63
 and members who would work continuously in 
Moscow.
64
 Tomsky endorsed Vorobev’s list, emphasizing that only those from 
the former Workers’ Opposition who were “serious workers, not those who will 
conduct politics,” could be allowed in the new central committee of the union.65 
On Vorobev’s list, only three nominees either were supporters of Shliapnikov or 
sympathized with him; Vladimirov was among the full members of the central 
committee on his list; Tolokontsev and Orlov were among the candidate mem-
bers. Skliznev’s list contained twenty-five full members, of whom at least half 
shared Shliapnikov’s views on the role of unions.66 Vorobev’s list passed with 
ninety-nine votes, as opposed to eighty-four for Skliznev’s list.67 
By the March 6 session of the communist fraction of the Metalworkers’ Un-
ion’s congress, the Comintern had made its decision censuring the Twenty-Two. 
Zinoviev and Clara Zetkin appeared at the fraction’s session that day to inform 
delegates of the Comintern commission’s decision. In response, the fraction vot-
ed unanimously (with five abstentions) to “caution” those who signed the appeal 
“from further such acts, threatening a split of the most disciplined communist 
party in the world – Russia’s.” The unanimous vote is surprising, since a large 
minority of the delegates were supporters of Shliapnikov. A March 7 politburo 
resolution confirms that nearly the entire minority group at the congress had in-
deed voted for the “caution.”68 Those of the minority who so voted apparently 
did so to indicate their loyalty to party discipline and recognition of the Comin-
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tern as the highest party court. The five who abstained most likely were among 
those who signed the appeal. 
Despite the fraction’s unanimous vote to “caution” Shliapnikov and others 
who signed the Letter of the Twenty-Two, Shliapnikov’s supporters continued 
to rally around him in the struggle to maintain some influence over the union. 
As Shliapnikov and his colleagues had agreed in their meeting before the con-
gress began, after the fraction’s majority had accepted Vorobev’s list for the 
new central committee, they proposed proportional representation in the central 
committee and agreement of lists. The fraction could not decide whether to ac-
cept proportionality and on March 7 asked the CC for a final decision. The pol-
itburo, in the name of the CC, rejected proportionality, stating that the list of the 
majority was sufficiently representative of all different views among the union’s 
members. Furthermore, it referred to those on Skliznev’s list as comprising “a 
group, being the minority of the fraction and censured by an international con-
ference.”69   
The Fifth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union ended on March 8, 1922 
without a single victory for Shliapnikov and those who shared his views. Rather, 
the votes of the communist fraction of the congress had made clear that the new 
leadership of the union had managed to eke out a majority among the delegates. 
The large minority of votes received by Shliapnikov and his fellows at this late 
date testifies to the depth of their support among rank-and-file metalworker un-
ionists and the difficulty the party and new union leaders had in extinguishing it. 
Shliapnikov had not accepted defeat by delegates at the Tenth Party Congress or 
by the party politburo at the Fourth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union. After 
censure by the Comintern and defeat by delegates to the Fifth Congress of his 
own Metalworkers’ Union, he had almost no hope for recovery.   
 
The interlude 
Until the Eleventh Party Congress in late March-early April 1922, Shliapni-
kov and others who had signed the Letter of the Twenty-Two were in political 
limbo. Some among the party leadership were not content to stop with the Com-
intern’s decision, but intended to prosecute the Twenty-Two for factionalism. 
The Twenty-Two were on the defensive, forced to explain repeatedly in writing 
and in person what had compelled them to appeal to the Comintern. As the 
Eleventh Party Congress drew nearer, Shliapnikov and other prominent figures 
among the Twenty-Two faced the prospect of exclusion from the Communist 
party. The decision of the Comintern was used as fodder in the Soviet press to 
attack the signatories and other former supporters of the Workers’ Opposition 
for violation of party discipline and for continuing to conduct factional work. 
The party press falsely described the signatories as ideologically tainted by 
Menshevism, anarchism and all other political associations especially repugnant 
to Russian communists at that time. 
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Nikolai Bukharin, who edited Pravda from 1917 to 1929, must have been 
complicit at the very least in the campaign against the Twenty-Two and at the 
most in charge of it and a chief participant. Although he would not have under-
taken the campaign without approval from the politburo, Bukharin had his own 
reasons to press it. He was strongly opposed to factionalism within the party, he 
increasingly was identified as a chief advocate of NEP, and finally, he had de-
veloped an argument justifying the party’s dictatorship by claiming that the pro-
letariat was incapable of generating an “intellectual elite” from its own ranks 
with the ability to organize “all of society.” Bukharin thought that the proletariat 
had been unable to do this because of “bourgeois” control over education in cap-
italist society.
70
 Shliapnikov and his colleagues were a threat to Bukharin’s in-
terpretation both because of what they stood for and because of who they were:  
proletarians who had educated themselves and had proven to be capable organ-
izers and administrators during the Civil War and early NEP. Kollontai named 
Karl Radek as another of the principal authors of the press campaign to “smear” 
the Twenty-Two (she used the words “bul’varnaia” and “poshlaia” to describe 
one of his articles).
71
 Lenin could not have been actively involved in the press 




Despite furious accusations in the press against Shliapnikov and others of the 
Twenty-Two, Shliapnikov still received letters of support from individual work-
er-communists and party cells scattered across Russia. These letters, no doubt, 
boosted his morale in the trying month of March 1922; although it was neither 
widespread nor deep − support came chiefly from old members of the party who 
knew him well. In expressing their solidarity with the Twenty-Two, those sup-
porters overcame enormous pressure from party leaders to condemn the appeal 
to the Comintern; but as one informed Shliapnikov, there were few like them 
left.
73
 Indeed, in his research on the relationship between Moscow industrial 
workers and the Russian Communist party during the Civil War and NEP, Si-
mon Pirani found no interest among factory-level Moscow communists in the 
discussion about the appeal of the Twenty-Two to the Comintern, only ritual 
condemnations. I. I. Litvinov, a memoirist, also wrote of apathy among Moscow 
workers toward the appeal, but acknowledged that at higher levels in the party 
there was a large measure of sympathy for the Twenty-Two, even among their 
opponents.
74
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Despite expressions of support that Shliapnikov received from individual 
workers, a campaign grew in the party press and in higher party organs to go be-
yond the Comintern’s censure and to punish the twenty-two communists more 
harshly. This campaign was mounted on the basis of the letter itself but also on 
allegations regarding what Shliapnikov and Kollontai had said to the Comintern 
commission on March 3. In a letter to the CC, Shliapnikov protested distortions 
in the press of his statements to the Comintern commission that investigated the 
Letter of the Twenty-Two. Shliapnikov denied press accusations that he had 
threatened “worker uprisings,” insisting that he had only pointed out that worker 
dissatisfaction was so deep that sometimes it “erupted in the form of strikes.” 
The party press derided Shliapnikov for allegedly claiming that the Cheka had 
subjected him to a search. Shliapnikov explained that a person bringing him a 
letter had been searched and relieved of a letter addressed to him, and that he 
had complained to the Comintern commission about it. He clarified that many 
other letters to him had been “lost” in the mail, which to him demonstrated “the 




The campaign in the party press also utilized any flaws, real or apparent, in 
the political background of Shliapnikov’s supporters. For example, Sha-
durskaia’s signature on the Letter of the Twenty-Two did not include the year in 
which she joined the Communist party. This served as a pretext for party leaders 
to portray her as politically suspect, which tainted the rest of the Twenty-Two 
and their appeal. In fact, as Shadurskaia wrote to the politburo, she was a long-
time party member, as she was sure party leaders were well aware.
76
 
Miasnikov, another communist who had signed the Letter of the Twenty-
Two, was expelled from the Communist party by the politburo on February 20 
for “repeated violations of party discipline” and for attempting to create a fac-
tion within the party. Shliapnikov claimed he learned of this only after Mias-
nikov had signed the appeal to the Comintern. He immediately appealed to the 
politburo to reconsider its decision. The politburo refused. Shliapnikov’s oppo-
nents used Miasnikov’s exclusion and his signature on the Letter of the Twenty-
Two to discredit the letter itself and those who had signed it.   
Shliapnikov did not back away from Miasnikov’s defense. On March 8, he 
again asked the politburo to review the Miasnikov case, but the politburo re-
fused. Later, at the Eleventh Party Congress, Shliapnikov reminded delegates 
that Miasnikov had never been a member of the Workers’ Opposition. He insist-
ed that Miasnikov would not have been among the signatories of the Letter of 
the Twenty-Two if his expulsion had been known. Nevertheless, Shliapnikov 
openly disagreed with the politburo’s decision on Miasnikov. Calling Miasnikov 
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“a proletarian (who has given his whole life for the party),” Shliapnikov argued 
that the party should work with such a person, not “throw him over the side.”77     
Political pressure on Shliapnikov and his colleagues increased in March 
1922. Even earlier, they had agreed that one option for them was to relinquish 
their party-appointed positions voluntarily and return to manual labor. A March 
9, 1922 letter from Sergei Medvedev to the orgburo illustrates this tactic. In the 
letter, Medvedev complained of the abuse Pravda had hurled against him after 
he signed the Letter of the Twenty-Two. As a result, he wrote, he felt towards 
himself, “no political or personal trust whatsoever from the CC or its organs.” 
He declared that he would not accept future work assignments from the organs 
of the CC but instead would return to work in his specialty, in a metalworking 
factory.
78
 It is not clear whether Medvedev ever delivered the letter to the or-
gburo. He continued receiving work assignments from the CC well into the sec-
ond half of the 1920s. 
The tension the twenty-two communists felt regarding the reaction of party 
leaders to their appeal increased after an incident that Shliapnikov believed to be 
a provocation. He reported to the politburo that on March 10, a “German com-
rade,” who introduced herself as Goldstein and claimed to be a representative of 
the German Communist Workers’ Party (KAPD), came to his residence in Mos-
cow. She invited him and the “Workers’ Opposition” to participate in a confer-
ence of the Fourth International.  Shliapnikov reported that he told her that there 
was at that time no “Workers’ Opposition” and that the group existing by that 
name before the Tenth Party Congress had never been a special faction or party. 
He added that he would condemn an attempt to split the Third International. 
Goldstein replied that a faction within the KAPD disapproved of the creation of 
a Fourth International. Somewhat inexplicably (and reinforcing Shliapnikov’s 
suspicion that she was a provocateur), she then asked him to give an answer to 
her invitation in writing and to discuss the position of the Workers’ Opposition 
in the German press. Shliapnikov refused.
79
 
Party leaders used not only the party press but also the Central Control 
Commission (CCC) against the oppositionists. The CCC was formed at the 
Ninth Party Conference in September 1920 and its role and responsibilities were 
defined at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. Among its early leaders were 
Dzerzhinsky and Iaroslavsky. Although a chief responsibility of the commis-
sions at the center and at the local level was to try ethical infractions among par-
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ty members, the commissions were also an important tool in discovering and 
punishing factionalism within the party.
80
 The CCC conducted formal interroga-
tions of the twenty-two communists. The first step in this process was a formal 
letter from Krivov,
81
 the secretary of the CCC, to Shliapnikov, as presumed 
leader of the Twenty-Two, requesting that he present in writing his evidence for 
accusing party centers of “struggle against proletarians with their own opin-
ions.” Krivov also required Shliapnikov to explain why he did not present his 
evidence to the party before submitting it to the Comintern. More provocatively, 
Krivov wanted Shliapnikov to answer whether he thought that his accusations 
could “lead to a party split.” Krivov asked Shliapnikov whether he would com-
ply with the Comintern commission’s ban on future appeals. He ended by sug-
gesting ominously that the Letter of the Twenty-Two violated the Tenth Party 
Congress’ resolution on party unity.82 
Shliapnikov prefaced his answers to Krivov with the comment that he con-
sidered it “unusual” for the CCC to become involved in an exclusively political 
matter. Moreover, since the Comintern, as the highest court in the communist 
movement had already made a decision on the affair, he considered it inappro-
priate for the CCC, as a lower court, to re-examine it. Nevertheless, Shliapnikov 
provided Krivov with examples of persecution. After citing numerous cases, 
Shliapnikov added wryly, “I have no doubt that in your files there is rather more 
material than I have in my memory.” In reply to Krivov’s second question, 
Shliapnikov wrote that he had tried to get the CC to discuss his grievances but 
had been unsuccessful in doing so. As to whether his accusations could weaken 
the party, he declared forcefully that in the past the Bolsheviks had never feared 
discussion of their faults. Rather, elimination of the causes for these faults would 
strengthen the party. He declared emphatically that he did not intend to violate 
the Comintern’s ban on future appeals. Nevertheless, he said that he believed the 
appeal had not violated the Tenth Party Congress’s ban on factionalism.83 
Shliapnikov rejected the CCC’s designation of him as “leader” of the Twenty-
Two, insisting that his replies to Krivov’s letter were only on his own behalf and 
that he did not speak for others who had signed. By insisting on these points, he 
avoided confessing to factionalism but may have inadvertently enhanced the 
probability that his colleagues would also be interrogated. 
On March 17, 1922, the CCC met with the Twenty-Two collectively.
84
 
Medvedev demanded to know whether this meeting was an interrogation or a 
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precursor to a criminal prosecution. Ozol and Smidovich
85
 of the CCC replied 
that this was not a question of crime and punishment, but of investigating griev-
ances for the sake of healthy “party life.” Significantly, the CCC would not give 
Medvedev a guarantee that there would be no criminal prosecutions arising from 
the Letter of the Twenty-Two. In most cases, the interviewees’ statements corre-
sponded to Shliapnikov’s answers to Krivov. Medvedev, after echoing Shliapni-
kov’s explanations of why the twenty-two communists appealed to the Comin-
tern, added that he found it ironic that party leaders had published the appeal in 
Pravda, which “made it available to counterrevolutionary forces.”   
Each of those present emphasized different reasons for signing. G. Bruno
86
 
explained that he signed the appeal because he, as a member of a guberniia 
purge commission, had witnessed central organs restore to the party “alien ele-
ments” purged by the guberniia commission. Disillusion with the results of the 
purge, he insisted, caused the “best elements to leave the party.” Tolokontsev 
said agreements made to buy manufactured products (especially locomotives) 
abroad, rather than to produce them in Russia, drove him to sign the Letter of 
the Twenty-Two. He did not number himself among those who had been perse-
cuted for membership in the opposition since he held several positions of higher 
authority. Despite his high positions, Tolokontsev said, he could not remain si-
lent in the face of “actions, which kill the proletariat.” Kollontai said the inten-
tion of the appeal to the Comintern was to force the party to think seriously 
about its problems. She was most concerned, she said, with the “mass departure 
of workers from the party,” which to her meant that workers’ influence on the 
party was diminishing. She added, “When we gather for a meeting, the suspicion 
is raised that this threatens a split in the party, an undermining of someone’s au-
thority.” She acknowledged that she would obey the Comintern’s directive, but 
added that she would not keep silent if nothing changed. Mitin stated that he too 
would continue to air grievances as an individual, although perhaps not again 
with others in an appeal.
87
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Members of the CCC responded with condemnation rather than debate. A. 
Solts
88
 urged them to recant. Z. Sedoi
89
 warned the signatories that they had tak-
en “the path to the creation of special groupings and factions.” A tense exchange 
occurred between Ozol and Medvedev in the course of which Ozol asked 
Medvedev if he thought that the current members of the CC and CCC had no 
right to sit in these organs. Medvedev replied tersely, “The [Tenth Party] Con-
gress elected you; I did not vote.” Obviously annoyed, Ozol repeated his warn-
ing from the Tenth Party Congress that Medvedev and Kollontai would not 
change their behavior because of the congress’s decrees.90 At this point, the ar-
chival record of the interrogation breaks off, but it appears that the meeting con-
tinued, perhaps without a stenographer. After its investigation, the CCC recom-
mended the exclusion from the party of those members of the Twenty-Two who 
had been “guilty of frequent, systematic violation of the Tenth Party Congress’s 
decree on party unity.”91 The CCC’s investigation set the stage for an investiga-
tion by a commission of the Eleventh Party Congress as to whether Shliapnikov 
and others should be expelled from the Communist party for violation of the 
Tenth Party Congress’s ban on factionalism. Shliapnikov’s troubles did not end 
there. On March 25 the CC officially put on hold his work as a member of the 
Genoa conference delegation for the duration of the Eleventh Party Congress.
92
 
For practical purposes Shliapnikov was not permitted to participate in the Genoa 
negotiations. 
 
Eleventh Communist Party Congress 
At the Eleventh Party Congress (March 27-April 2, 1922), Shliapnikov and 
his supporters defended themselves against charges of having violated party uni-
ty with their appeal to the Comintern. Their opponents charged them with hav-
ing continued to organize themselves as the “Workers’ Opposition” and of hav-
ing pursued a line contrary to party policy. Because of the party leadership’s 
campaign in the winter of 1921-22 to remove supporters of the former Workers’ 
Opposition from their organizational bases, only four of thirty-seven known 
Workers’ Oppositionists at the Tenth Party Congress were voting delegates at 
                                                 
88. A. A. Solts (1872-1945) had joined the party in 1898, in 1912-13 was a member of the Pe-
tersburg committee of the RSDRP, in 1917 was a member of the Moscow committee of the 
RSDRP(b) and an editor of Sotsial-Demokrat, was a Left Communist in 1918, and from 1921 
worked in the CCC (Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 851). 
89. Z. Ia. Litvin-Sedoi (1876-1947) joined the party in 1897, was a leader of the December 1905 
uprising in Moscow, lived in emigration from 1906-1917, returned to Russia in 1917 and participat-
ed in the Civil War, then worked in the Commissariat of Transport and central board of military sup-
ply (Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 832; Deiateli SSSR i oktiabrskoi revoliutsii, 3:  31). 
90. RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9103, vol. 3, ll. 97, 103. 
91. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, l. 3. 
92. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 77, l. 2, March 25, 1922. The Genoa conference (April 10 - May 19, 
1922) was to bring representatives from Germany and the USSR together for the first time with rep-
resentatives of thirty-two other European nations to discuss trade and financial questions. No agree-
ment was reached, however, on repayment of tsarist debts or cancellation of Russian wartime debts. 
Early Dissent within the Party: Alexander Shliapnikov and the Letter of the Twenty-Two               45 45 
the Eleventh Party Congress.
93
 Therefore those who sympathized with the griev-
ances of the Twenty-Two represented a very small number of delegates to the 
Congress. Nevertheless the congress was characterized by “a rebellious mood” 
directed against some features of NEP and against the expanding powers of the 
party control commissions. The Twenty-Two thus stood some chance of benefit-
ing from the delegates’ mood, especially since two high-ranking leaders were 
absent or had a reduced presence at the congress. Lenin, whose charisma and 
persuasive powers could sway a congress, missed a number of sessions due to 
his poor health; and Bukharin, a highly effective speaker and critic of the Twen-
ty-Two, was not present at the congress.
94
 
Aware of the numerical inferiority of his supporters at the congress, Shliap-
nikov attempted to appeal to a broad range of delegates. His purpose was not to 
convince them to support his ideas for change but at the least to convince them 
that the party’s relationship with workers was truly troubled and in need of re-
pair. Most of all he wished to reveal the party leadership’s condemnation of the 
Letter of the Twenty-Two as an attempt to cover up rather than resolve the par-
ty’s problems. In a speech at an open session of the congress, Shliapnikov de-
nied that the Workers’ Opposition had continued to function as a group, explain-
ing that “for someone it is necessary to create this ‘Workers’ Opposition’.” He 
meant that party leaders would rather blame the party’s troubles on a scapegoat, 
on a conspiracy of malcontents, rather than address genuine problems. Shliapni-
kov went on to warn that worker discontent posed a real threat to the party, de-
claring that workers were saying that it was “better to lose power now, in order 
to take it anew in ten years.” In response to Lenin’s contention that the Russian 
proletariat had ceased to exist as a class in the Marxist sense, Shliapnikov pro-
nounced the sarcastic phrase often repeated since by historians of the period, 
“Allow me to congratulate you [congress delegates] on being the vanguard of a 
nonexistent class.” Shliapnikov did not share the view that the Russian proletari-
at had degenerated; rather, he thought this perspective was an attempt to seek 
“justification for political maneuvers, searches for support in other social lay-
ers.” He insisted, “Another and ‘better’ working class we will not have and it’s 
necessary to be satisfied with the one we do have.”95 
Ever fond of militaristic metaphor, Lenin accused the Twenty-Two of having 
created panic in the party ranks with their appeal. Lenin expanded the metaphor 
when he reminded delegates that in a real army those who created panic during a 
retreat were shot “and correctly so.”96 Shliapnikov gamely retorted that the 
Comintern was “not a maneuvering army.” With this answer Shliapnikov under-
lined the danger posed to the Russian party by its leaders’ unwillingness to dis-
cuss serious problems with fellow communists. Shliapnikov even questioned the 
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basis for prosecuting any of the twenty-two communists at the Eleventh Party 
Congress since all of those who signed had already accepted the decision of the 
Comintern. Shliapnikov tried to remind party leaders and delegates of their for-
merly comradely relations and to emphasize that the fading of these relations 
posed a danger to the party’s very existence. If the party turned its back on its 
core constituency of workers, Shliapnikov believed, it would lose its right to 
rule. He warned that the atmosphere in the party reminded him of that in 1907 
when intellectuals abandoned the workers and showed apathy toward the cause 
of revolution. He reminded delegates that he and his supporters were not alien 
political elements weakening the Communist party; rather, they were com-
munists of worker origin who represented the party’s core constituency.97 
Shliapnikov proclaimed finally and dramatically, “This should not be forgotten.  
We came from [the working class] to this tribune, and back [to the working 
class] we will return.”98   
Kollontai described in her diary the atmosphere on the eve of the congress 
and during its first few sessions. Although there was talk of excluding her, 
Shliapnikov, and Medvedev from the party, she sensed “vacillation” and a 
“wait-and-see attitude” at the top (Lenin for one might not have taken a clear 
stance toward exclusion of the three from the party).
99
 She believed that a core 
group of “yes-men” around party leaders were pushing for expulsion and even 
more (perhaps she meant criminal prosecution). Yet once the question of exclu-
sion was spoken aloud at the congress, she sensed “at once sympathy toward us 
from part of the congress.” Many delegates, she wrote, were dissatisfied with the 
CC’s decisions; although those delegates condemned the decision to appeal to 
the Comintern, they sympathized with the content of the appeal. In her diary 
Kollontai wrote that the commission appointed by party leaders to investigate 
the Twenty-Two had no members sympathetic to the opposition; nevertheless, 
                                                 
97. Sedoi of the CCC had attempted to smear Sergei Medvedev with Menshevism; Shliapnikov 
reminded him that when he (Sedoi) was enlisting in the French army as a volunteer (against the Par-
ty’s instructions), Medvedev was on his way to Siberian exile for organizing Petrograd workers to 
strike in protest against the arrest and trial of antiwar Bolshevik Duma deputies (“Vot ironiia 
sud’by,” Shliapnikov drily added).Odinnatsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), pp. 187-88. Sedoi protested Shliapni-
kov’s accusation (ibid., p. 190), but judging from Sedoi’s own autobiography in Deiateli SSSR i ok-
tiabr’skoi revoliutsii, 3: 30-31, his stance toward the war was ambiguous, to say the least. 
98. Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 188. 
99. At a meeting between Shliapnikov and CCC presidium members in late 1926, Kuibyshev 
claimed that Lenin had favored Shliapnikov’s exclusion from the party in 1922, while Shliapnikov 
protested that Lenin was against his exclusion. When Solts (who had been CCC chair in 1922) de-
clared that Lenin had never spoken against exclusion, Shliapnikov replied that Stalin had told him 
that it had been a mistake to propose exclusion of Shliapnikov, Medvedev and Kollontai at the Elev-
enth Party Congress and that Lenin had not made that mistake. Shliapnikov thought that if Lenin had 
spoken in favor of exclusion, then it would have passed (RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 9103 (Shliapni-
kov’s CCC file), vol. 1, ll. 149-68, CCC presidium session, October 23, 1926). At the very least, it 
appears that Lenin did not speak in favor of exclusion.   
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On April 2, 1922, delegates to the Eleventh Party Congress met in a special 
closed session to hear, discuss, and consider the findings and recommendations 
of the commission formed to investigate the Twenty-Two.
101
 The commission’s 
task was to decide whether those members of the Twenty-Two who had earlier 
belonged to the Workers’ Opposition had violated the Tenth Congress’s ban on 
factionalism and to make appropriate recommendations. The commission’s re-
port determined that there were ideological and organizational links between the 
former Workers’ Opposition and meetings of those who signed the Letter of the 
Twenty-Two. The CC had recognized that party members had the right to appeal 
individually to the Comintern. The commission could not therefore accuse the 
twenty-two communists of factionalism simply on the grounds of their letter. It 
had to prove that the meeting arranged by Shliapnikov and Medvedev to discuss 
the appeal was the culmination of “constant long-term factional work” by 
Shliapnikov, Medvedev, and other oppositionists. The evidence the commission 
produced of this “long-term factional work” was based chiefly on a letter Mitin 
had sent to Medvedev in the summer of 1921,
102
 in which Mitin referred to 
meetings of the former Workers’ Opposition after the Tenth Party Congress and 
to his tactics for taking over the Donbas party organization.
103
   
The commission singled out Shliapnikov, Medvedev, and Kollontai as those 
most guilty of having continued “factional work” and it recommended their ex-
pulsion for an indefinite period for having violated the Tenth Party Congress’ di-
rectives on unity and against factionalism. Of the remaining signatories, the 
commission recommended to expel only Mitin and N. Kuznetsov.
104
 In the case 
of Mitin, actions described in his July 1921 letter to Medvedev and having hid-
den his past membership in the Menshevik party called for expulsion. Kuznetsov 
was charged with having been deceptive as to when he entered the party and for 
having misrepresented his social origins. Those signatories who were not target-
ed for exclusion proclaimed their solidarity with Shliapnikov, Kollontai and 
Medvedev (but notably not with Mitin and Kuznetsov). They announced that if 
                                                 
100. RGASPI, f. 134, op. 3, d. 37, l. 37.  The commission was composed of nineteen members, 
including Solts, Zinoviev, Stalin, and Dzerzhinskii (Clements, Bolshevik Feminist, p. 218).  For its 
report, see Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), pp. 702-10. 
101. The proceedings of this session were not published in the stenographic report of the con-
gress, but were preserved in Communist party archives and became available to researchers only in 
the 1990s.   
102. The letter was published in “Rabochaia oppozitsiia”: materialy i dokumenty, 1920-1926 
gg., ed. M. Zorky (Moscow/Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1926), pp. 51-53.  
103. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 3-7. 
104. N. Kuznetsov (1898-1935) entered the party during World War I (not in 1904) and before 
the war had worked as a grocer, not a metalworker, a commission of Old Bolsheviks established.  
Kuznetsov joined Miasnikov’s “Workers’ Group” in 1923. 
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those three were expelled from the party, they would resign as well. Lebed of 
the CCC warned that they were in possible violation of party discipline.
105
 
Following Lebed’s warning, Shliapnikov, Kollontai, and Medvedev spoke. 
Kollontai, who spoke first, protested the growing tendency of party leaders to 
make a “faction” out of any group of communists meeting informally. She noted 
pointedly, “When two of us are together, we can talk, but when the third comes 
(laughter), we drop silent. We fear one another. We think that this third com-
munist can suppose that we two are the Workers’ Opposition.” Kollontai said 
that the party should consider it healthy for its members to meet as friends and 
discuss issues of vital importance to the party. The party, she insisted, could on-
ly gain from this. Kollontai steadfastly denied that the Twenty-Two had formed 
a faction. Next, Kollontai addressed charges that she and Medvedev were par-
ticularly unrepentant about their appeal to the Comintern. She said that they 
were told that if they had shown “sincere repentance,” then they would have 
been treated differently. In a gently mocking manner, Kollontai recalled a tale of 
the nineteenth century Russian satirist M. Saltykov-Shchedrin:   
 
Peasants who were sent into exile were asked: why were you exiled? − 
They answered, because we were unrepentant. The landowner taught us 
what was good, intelligent, and reasonable. He even dragged us by our hair. 
Still, we were unrepentant and were exiled.   
 
Kollontai emphasized her loyalty to the party, her devotion to giving the 
leading role in the party and outside it to the working class, as she put it, to the 
“attraction of the working class into creative life in all areas” and to the imple-
mentation of the Tenth Party Congress’s decree on worker democracy. Kollontai 
dramatically concluded, “If there is no place for this in our party, then exclude 
me. But even outside of the ranks of our party, I will live, work and fight for the 
Communist party.”106  
Shliapnikov spoke next. Scoffing at the presentation of Mitin’s single letter 
as proof of “systematic contact” between leaders of the former Workers’ Oppo-
sition and their followers, Shliapnikov insisted that the former oppositionists had 
not aimed to create a faction, but only to “work within the party.” The meetings 
of those who signed the Letter of the Twenty-Two, he insisted, were not formal 
meetings of a group, but of “old friends” and friends of old friends. “To make a 
faction out of this,” he insisted, “is just as difficult to do as from a tea party or 
pancake suppers which take place in Moscow, even in the Kremlin.” The meet-
ings in reality were a bit more formal than Shliapnikov suggested. They were 
chaired, there was an agenda, a vote at the end, and a record of the discussion 
                                                 
105. Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 710; RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 9-13.  D. Z. Lebed 
(1893-1939) came to the Bolsheviks from the SRs in 1909, after the October Revolution edited the 
journal Vestnik Narkomvnudel and later became secretary of the CC of the Ukrainian Communist 
Party and chairman of the CCC in Ukraine (Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 830). 
106. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 14-24. 
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was made. The form of the meetings was nonetheless consistent with longstand-
ing practice in the party and did not violate party discipline as it had been under-
stood before the Tenth Party Congress.  In this sense Shliapnikov was being 
truthful when he declared the meetings not to be of a factional nature. Shliapni-
kov emphasized, “The unity of the party is for me higher than anything. Devel-
oping a counterattack, he charged with factionalism those (among the Leninists) 
who condemned former opposition members. He complained that party cells 
were not allowed to invite him to speak to them, and he showed that there was 
support for him among lower level party members by referring to his election by 
cells of four factories as a delegate to their guberniia conferences. Shliapnikov 
concluded, “if you find . . . that our thoughts and worries about the fate of the 
working class are alien to you, then, all right, exclude us.”107 
Medvedev, the last of the three to speak, could not restrain himself from re-
sorting to his customary sarcasm toward the charge of factionalism against the 
Twenty-Two. He pointed out the contradiction between V. Molotov’s proclama-
tions in open sessions of the congress that party unity had been established and 
“groupings” dissolved, and Lebed’s claim in closed session that the Workers’ 
Opposition continued to exist. Medvedev expressed ironic surprise at Molotov’s 
lack of diligence in failing to notice such a large and active group, as Lebed had 
described. Like Shliapnikov, Medvedev referred to the support he had among 
workers. Workers at the Radio Morse factory had elected him as one of their 
delegates to the congress of the Moscow Metalworkers’ Union, even after the 
commission had announced its intent to pursue Medvedev’s exclusion from the 
party. Medvedev thus declared, he had survived trial before “a court of the 
working class.” Unlike Shliapnikov, his words carried a defiant tone; he de-
clared that even if the congress excluded him from the party, “I do not think you 
will fatally wound me.” Medvedev proclaimed that he did not stand in fear of 
the delegates’ decision. “I have told the truth, and your business is to decide,” he 
concluded.
108
   
Following the three oppositionists’ speeches, four well-respected and long-





 were opposed to exclusion and two did not take a 
clear position. D. Manuilsky spoke for “strong measures” against the opposition-
ists and G. Petrovsky
111
 criticized the oppositionists for poor judgment, but nei-
                                                 
107. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 50-64.  
108. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 126-131. 
109. N. A. Kubiak (1882-1942) joined the party in 1898. In 1922 he was secretary of the Dal-
biuro of the CC and later secretary of the CC (Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 829). 
110. V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko (1884-1939), whose father was a tsarist officer, had been a revo-
lutionary from 1901, a Menshevik while in emigration, and a Bolshevik since 1917.  During the civil 
war he was commander of the Ukrainian front and a member of the NKVD collegium of the RSFSR 
(Odinnadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 809). Under Stalin, he was repressed.   
111. G. I. Petrovsky (1878-1958) had joined the party in 1897, was a Bolshevik deputy to the 
Fourth Duma in 1912-14.  In 1918-19, he served as People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, and 
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ther came out for exclusion. Kollontai rejoiced at the tone of the speakers; in her 
opinion, Kubiak and Antonov-Ovseenko were “for” her, Shliapnikov, and 




Kubiak had signed the theses of the Workers’ Opposition but not the Letter 
of the Twenty-Two. In his speech, he reminded delegates of the long history of 
“struggle” played out at party congresses and in party committees between intel-
lectuals (or students) and workers. He recalled how students edged workers out 
of party leadership posts because, students claimed, workers were illiterate and 
could not make speeches. There had been a “workers’ faction,” of which Kubiak 
was a member, at the 1904 congress in London, where the question of elevating 
workers’ role in the party was discussed and the first worker, “Foma,” was 
brought into the CC. Kubiak also referred to the fact that the Stockholm Con-
gress in 1906 was “called by the workers’ party.” Presenting party history in this 
light, Kubiak legitimated the efforts of Shliapnikov and others to provide a 
“worker” perspective to party policy and to increase the role of workers in party 
leadership. Kubiak attacked both the arguments and the evidence for exclusion. 
He found party leaders’ acknowledgements that the Twenty-Two had the right 
to appeal to the Comintern contradicted their simultaneous condemnation of 
Shliapnikov and his supporters for appealing to the Comintern. Kubiak added 
that if individual letters (such as Mitin’s) were taken to prove the existence of an 
anti-party faction, then one could find letters equally worthy of discussion on 
Lenin’s desk from various authors, some of whom sat among the congress’ del-
egates. There was no evidence that Shliapnikov and his supporters “prepared for 
a split,” he insisted. Finally, Kubiak agreed with Shliapnikov and Medvedev that 
with their party history it was “the purest nonsense” to insist that they prove 
their “dedication to the working class.” He was not so charitable toward Mitin 
and Kuznetsov. Kubiak agreed that Mitin and Kuznetsov should be expelled 
from the party, but he proposed that the delegates simply confirm the decision of 
the Comintern pertaining to Shliapnikov, Medvedev, and Kollontai.
113
 
Petrovsky rejected Kubiak’s argument that Shliapnikov’s, Medvedev’s and 
Kollontai’s history of service on the party’s behalf warranted a lighter punish-
ment for them. In his opinion senior members of the party should show more 
discipline than should newer members. He thought that Shliapnikov and the oth-
ers had unwisely surrendered to the panicked mood created among some party 
members by “rumors about the imminent ‘sale’ of Russia at the Genoa confer-
ence.” Recalling his own initial participation in the Workers’ Opposition,114 Pe-
                                                                                                                                                 
from 1919 to 1938 was chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet and then of the All-Union Soviet.  In 1922 
he was a member of the CC. 
112. RGASPI, f. 134, op. 3, d. 37, l. 39, Tuesday, April 11, 1922.   
113. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 65-67. 
114. No secondary sources have mentioned Petrovsky’s participation in the Workers’ Opposi-
tion, nor did I find archival confirmation of it. Nevertheless, Petrovsky’s surprising admission should 
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trovsky said he still supported the goal of bringing more workers into the CC, 
but that he found this single goal an inadequate basis for forming an “entire op-
position.” He abandoned the group, he said, when he began to see “former Men-
sheviks” and persons who were “not mature, seasoned proletarians” at the 
group’s meetings. He blamed Kollontai for attracting “former Mensheviks” into 
the opposition and for the opposition’s venture into “heresy.” Nevertheless Pe-
trovsky did not seem to think Shliapnikov’s and Kollontai’s mistakes warranted 
severe punishment (significantly, he omitted mention of Medvedev). Concerning 
use of Mitin’s letter and remarks made by Shliapnikov and Kollontai to prove 
their disloyalty to the party, Petrovsky concluded that one could not “look at all 
documents from a gendarme’s point of view.” Rather than analyzing “each letter 
of a word,” one had to consider whether true factional activities had occurred.115 
Petrovsky seemed to think that they had not occurred; he did not call explicitly 
for the exclusion of anyone from the former opposition. 
Antonov-Ovseenko gave the most effective speech against excluding Shliap-
nikov, Kollontai, and Medvedev. He assured delegates that as a special plenipo-
tentiary of the CC in Samara in 1921-22, he had worked closely with members 
of the former Workers’ Opposition and had not sensed any underground, anti-
party work. On the contrary, they had shown the greatest dedication to work 
within the party. Noting that some of Shliapnikov’s, Kollontai’s, and 
Medvedev’s statements met with “applause” at the congress, he said one could 
not deny that there was a “hidden illness” in the party. Echoing Shliapnikov, 
Antonov-Ovseenko said that exclusion of those who called attention to the par-
ty’s illness would not overcome factionalism but only cause more harm. He 
openly described the commission’s case as “contrived” and “quite obviously un-
founded.” He argued that the Russian party congress could not call for greater 
punishment than had the Comintern without discrediting the latter as the highest 
organ of the international Communist movement. He suggested a ritual condem-
nation of the Letter of the Twenty-Two, abiding by the Comintern’s decision on 
the matter. Antonov-Ovseenko was thus against excluding Shliapnikov, 
Medvedev, and Kollontai from the party unless they violated party discipline in 
the future, proposing a resolution to that effect.
116
  
Manuilsky, severely criticizing the Twenty-Two, repeated charges that their 
work had been directed toward the formation of a liberal workers’ party and that 
their appeal had been exploited by Mensheviks to discredit the Communist par-
ty. In juxtaposition to Shliapnikov’s and Medvedev’s claims of worker support, 
Manuilsky cited scores of resolutions by assemblies of party members across 
Ukraine, unanimously demanding to exclude the offenders from the Communist 
party. He nonetheless stopped short of recommending expulsion from the party, 
                                                                                                                                                 
be taken at face value; obviously, he had no motivation to boast falsely about having been a partici-
pant of a banned faction. 
115. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 70-71. 
116. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 72-73. 
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but only emphasized the need “to act severely in regard to frequent offend-
ers.”117 Manuilsky’s phrase left open the door for letting the oppositionists go 
with a warning. 
Following the debate there ensued a complicated series of resolutions, 
amendments, and votes. A detailed treatment of this is necessary for two rea-
sons: 1) to elucidate what has until now been a hazy and ambiguous event in 
Soviet history and 2) to support this article’s argument that the episode of the 
Twenty-Two was crucial in the party’s transformation during the transition from 
Lenin’s leadership to that of Stalin. Two resolutions on whether to exclude five 
members of the Twenty-Two were presented to this closed session of delegates 
to the Eleventh Party Congress: one, from the commission, to exclude Shliapni-
kov, Medvedev, Kollontai, Kuznetsov, and Mitin; a second, from Antonov-
Ovseenko, to support the Comintern’s resolution, but to go no further. An initial 
hand vote was so close that a clear judgment based on it could not be made. A 
majority of delegates rejected a roll-call vote, indicating that they did not want 
their votes to go on record. They revoted by upraised hand. The count estab-
lished 215 for Antonov-Ovseenko’s resolution and from 227 to 245 for the 
commission’s resolution. Then the chairman announced that the Petrograd dele-
gation (under Zinoviev’s control) had offered an amendment to the commis-
sion’s resolution which would allow the excluded comrades to rejoin the party 
after one year, if they maintained good behavior and showed dedication to the 
principles of the Communist party. A majority of the delegates accepted the 
amendment. Then, a delegate named P. A. Kin proposed a correction to the reso-
lution which called for excluding Kuznetsov and Mitin and accepting the Com-
intern’s decree only in relation to Kollontai, Shliapnikov, and Medvedev. Dele-
gates accepted Kin’s amendment by a vote of 225-235 against 215. The chair-
man objected that the combination of the original resolution with the amend-
ment and correction would look confusing “to Russian and foreign workers.” M. 
Tomsky added another correction, allowing the CC to exclude Shliapnikov, 
Medvedev, and Kollontai if they violated party discipline in the future. An 
overwhelming majority of the delegates passed the commission’s resolution af-
ter it was edited to take into account Tomsky’s and Kin’s corrections. The dele-
gates therefore decided by a narrow margin to exclude Kuznetsov and Mitin; but 
to allow Shliapnikov, Kollontai, and Medvedev to remain in the party unless 
they committed further violations of party unity. 
 
Conclusion 
During February-April 1922, Shliapnikov and his colleagues sensed a politi-
cal conjuncture that allowed the opportunity to air their grievances against some 
features of NEP and to convey their sense that party-worker relations were trou-
bled. The meetings, rather close to one another in time, of the Comintern Execu-
tive, the Fifth Congress of the Metalworkers’ Union, and the Eleventh Party 
                                                 
117. RGASPI, f. 48, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 75-78. 
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Congress meant that a small group could obtain the attention of a large audience 
(Russian communists, Russian metalworkers, and foreign communists) for its 
views. In addition, it was legitimate, within the framework of proper party pro-
cedure, to appeal to these forums. Shliapnikov and his allies therefore chose this 
time to act. 
The character of the actions Shliapnikov chose to take on his own behalf and 
on that of his supporters was consistent with his past political behavior and his 
attitude toward party politics. His political behavior was shaped by a certain 
sense of party legality. Shliapnikov took care to avoid actions that smacked of 
“factionalism” not only to escape punishment but also because he sincerely de-
sired party unity, a unity based on responsiveness to workers’ initiative. His un-
derstanding of factionalism did not include “comradely” meetings with his sup-
porters to discuss important issues of the day.  In his opinion such meetings 
were firmly rooted in party tradition. He did not create a centralized organiza-
tion with local branches; rather, he and his supporters communicated with one 
another through informal means. He emphasized that building an organization 
had to occur through local initiative. Not merely an attempt to avoid charges of 
factionalism, this accorded with Shliapnikov’s belief in initiative from below. If 
there were no such initiative, then there was no reason to continue opposition at 
the center. Finally, the most important reason for Shliapnikov to make an appeal 
to the highest levels of the party and to the international communist movement 
was to leave a historical record so that future generations of workers might make 
use of it as an “organizing moment.” Although he tried carefully to balance re-
spect for the opinions and wishes of his supporters and sympathetic rank-and-
file worker-communists with the demands of party legality, his opponents in the 
party leadership flouted traditions of internal party democracy when they resort-
ed to intimidation and slander.   
The controversy around the “Letter of the Twenty-Two” to the Comintern 
was crucial to the process by which the party defined the meaning of party dis-
cipline and the limits of political discussion within it. The vote by Eleventh Par-
ty Congress delegates, by a narrow margin and in a closed session, to allow 
Kollontai, Shliapnikov, and Medvedev to remain in the party “until further out-
bursts” signified that there was still much support within the party for their right 
to state their views. The maneuvering that took place around the vote revealed 
much about the dialogue between party leaders and highly placed members on 
the meaning of party discipline and the limits of internal political discussion. 
Some within the party leadership apparently had wanted to take measures be-
yond exclusion, possibly criminal prosecution. Certainly hints of this were pre-
sent both in the campaign within the party press and in remarks of CCC mem-
bers in interviews with the Twenty-Two. In her diaries Kollontai alluded to ru-
mors of criminal prosecution. Among congress delegates, there was much re-
sistance to exclusion of prominent and well-liked Communists from the party. 
When Lenin implied that “machine guns” could be used against opponents with-
in the party, most old party members probably understood he was speaking fig-
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uratively. Nevertheless, his choice of words, perhaps made more extreme by his 
illness,
118
 might have overstepped the bounds for many of these older delegates 
and contributed to their sympathy for the Twenty-Two. On the other hand, his 
reluctance to call outright for expulsion of Kollontai, Medvedev, and Shliapni-
kov may have emboldened other delegates to resist that option. 
Congress records also reveal that many delegates wanted to observe com-
munist “legality,” according to which the Comintern’s decisions prevailed over 
those of member-parties. Delegates, many of whom were experienced party ac-
tivists, confidently resisted the leadership’s campaign to expel the twenty-two, 
but were sufficiently concerned about retribution to resist a roll-call vote. Party 
leaders, sensing that delegates might balk at outright exclusion, did not risk a 
confrontation over this question. Instead, they decided to allow delegates to 
choose lesser measures. The possibility of criminal prosecution for dissent had 
nonetheless become a part of the political discourse within the party. As newer 
members recruited during the Civil War would increasingly replace “Old Bol-
sheviks” at party congresses, leaders’ intensely violent language would come to 
be understood more literally than had been the case in the past.   
Aside from questions of internal party “democracy,” crucial matters of poli-
cy led congress delegates to sympathize with the Twenty-Two and to resist the 
proposal to exclude Shliapnikov, Kollontai and Medvedev from the party. Many 
in the party felt guilt and discomfort over the ideological compromise that NEP 
entailed and they feared that concessions to the peasantry posed a danger to ur-
ban and industrial worker hegemony. Nevertheless, this very compromise with 
the peasantry and the consequent vulnerability of the “proletarian party” drove 
hard liners to insist that the party close ranks and stifle heterodoxy in order to 
survive the transition to socialism through NEP. Thus, the events surrounding 
the “Letter of the Twenty-Two” were a defining moment in the transitional stage 
between an era of relatively open discussion within the party and one in which 
party members could be vilified, stigmatized, and isolated for expressing opin-
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118. Pipes, in Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, pp. 457-58, argues that Lenin’s illness in-
duced him to greater intolerance and erratic behavior. 
